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INTRODUCTION
Understanding the incentive implications of performance measures used in remuneration contracts has become vital since the rapid introduction of performance-based compensation schemes in the last three decades. The classic principal-agent model acknowledges that the noise of a given performance measure determines its suitability for use in compensation contracts. The "noisier" the measure, the lower is the optimal incentive intensity. However, as Baker (2002) points out, the critical issue in most incentive contracts may not be the noisiness of the performance measure, but rather its "distortion". Baker defines distortion inversely as the extent to which the effect of effort on measured performance is aligned with the effect of effort on the firm's objective function.
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If a performance measure is "distorted", then agents can increase their performance outcomes in two ways: by engaging in productive activities that are intended by the principal or by engaging in unintended actions that are easier or cheaper from the agent's perspective. Performance pay based on a distorted performance measure will thus motivate agents to put costly effort into 'cheap' activities (increasing measured performance) to the possible detriment of organizational value. Such unproductive efforts are typically referred to as 'gaming efforts' (see Courty and Marschke, 2008) .
Performance measures are often assessed and chosen based on their correlation with firm value (see Baker, 2002; Courty and Marschke, 2008) . However, some measures that seem to be informative ex ante about the performance of the company become less informative when used for incentive purposes, revealing their distortion. Implementing a compensation scheme based on such distorted measures undermines the association between the measure and the value of the company.
Put differently, the mere use of a distorted performance measure in compensation degrades its quality as a measure of intended performance. The degree of (potential) degradation depends on the extent to which the measure is distorted. Thus, the suitability of a performance measure cannot 1 Theoretical multi-tasking models show an inverse relationship between the distortion of the performance measure and the efficient incentive intensity (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Datar et al., 2001; Baker, 2002). be measured by the ex ante correlation between the measure and the value of the company, as this correlation disregards the distortion not yet revealed.
An example involves the distortion of the performance measure "client satisfaction" when it is used in compensation schemes for sales employees. Client satisfaction, used as a performance measure, may provide valuable information about a sales employee's contribution to company performance. Using the measure as a basis for performance pay, however, creates an incentive for a sales employee to increase client satisfaction through 'cheap' effort: selling at low prices, for example, or even giving products away for free. The performance measure "client satisfaction" thus becomes degraded: it is less useful than originally expected as a basis for performance pay. Courty and Marschke (2008) developed an empirical test to detect distortion. Their test, based on a simple theoretical framework, assesses how a performance measure degrades when it is first used in a compensation contract or when its use in such a contract is intensified. The focus is on measuring the change in the association between the performance measure and organizational value due to an increase in the weight of the measure in the compensation scheme. A negative change indicates degradation of the quality of the measure, revealing a distortion. Courty and Marschke apply their test to performance measures introduced in the course of a natural experiment among agencies managing the US Governmental Job Training Partnership Act. They find weak support for the distortion of these measures. This paper applies the Courty and Marschke (2008) cannot be measured solely on the basis of firms' accounting data. It differs from Residual Income due to some -for researchers opaque-discretionary and standard adjustments. In our empirical analysis we measure RI for the firms in our sample and refer to this as the accounting based value of
EVA.
2 Unlike Courty and Marschke, the application in this paper does not concern a natural experiment, but reviews the experience of listed (US-based) firms that introduced this popular performance measure to reward management performance, mostly in the mid-nineties. This nonexperimental approach requires adapting the empirical Courty and Marschke test in order to address self-selection and to account for possible (systematic) changes in economic circumstances in the period studied. To this end, we apply a difference-in-differences approach and compare firms that adopted EVA with their non-adopter counterparts, before and after the boards of the former firms selected EVA as the performance measure in their employee compensation schemes. The results of this study indicate that the accounting based version of the company performance measure EVA is a distorted performance measure that can be gamed.
Our findings should not be interpreted as showing that EVA is a poor performance measure. It may well be the case that EVA is less distorted than most, if not all, alternative measures used in corporate practice. Our results only show that EVA is not first best, as it can be manipulated. Because this is likely to hold for all performance measures that can be realistically used in practice, 3 EVA may actually well be second best. We will return to this in the conclusion.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, it empirically assesses the distortion of a widely used performance measure in the remuneration packages of executive board members.
Second, the paper extends the Courty and Marschke test for distortions in performance measures to accommodate the potential endogeneity in the selection of performance measures (in this case, 2 We will discuss the differences between RI and EVA, and the possible consequences of these differences for our analysis, in Section 3. Using EVA data obtained from Stern Stewart is not possible in our application (see Section 3).
3 In the words of Murphy (2012, p. 38 ) "Conceptually, the "perfect" performance measure for a CEO is the CEO's personal contribution to the value of the firm. Unfortunately […] the available measures will inevitably exclude ways that the CEO creates value, and include the effects of factors not due to the efforts of the CEO, or fail to reveal ways that the CEO destroys value. The challenge in designing incentive plans is to select performance measures that capture important aspects of the CEO's contributions to firm value, while recognizing that all performance measures are imperfect and create unintended side effects."
EVA), so that it can be used in non-experimental settings. This is important because it is rarely the case that economists can get data from a truly experimental setting. Thus, our difference-indifferences approach to their test is of general applicability to real-world incentive contracts.
DETECTING DISTORTIONS IN A PERFORMANCE MEASURE
The test developed by Courty and Marschke (CM) The CM test is based on the assumption that changes in the levels of association between p 2 and V are solely caused by changes in the agent's effort choices. In their experimental setting, this assumption is likely to hold. In practice, however, there may be confounding factors.
To address this issue of confounding factors in our non-experimental setting, we compose control groups to benchmark the results of the firms that adopted EVA (=p 2 ). Firms are matched:
each firm in the treatment group (using newly introduced EVA from time t 0 onwards as the (sole) performance measure in the board's compensation contract) is matched with a comparable firm in the control group (using neither EVA nor any similar measure in the time span studied before and after t 0 ). Comparing the changes in association in the treatment group to those in the control group allows us to identify changes caused by altered effort incentives (assuming that changes in other factors are similar for treatment and control firms). We thus use a difference-in-differences approach to the CM tests described above.
We set up two control samples. The first matches treatment firms to firms of the same size and industry class. This control group is able to mitigate the bias resulting from changes in (economic) circumstances. The second control group is set up to mitigate the endogeneity bias due to self-selection. The introduction of EVA (or any other performance measure) to reward management performance is a deliberate strategic decision-and not based on random assignment.
For example, firms that observe a temporary high correlation between EVA and firm value may be especially inclined to adopt EVA for reward purposes. Sheer regression to the mean then results in a lower correlation in the period after adoption-even when distortion plays no role at all. Using an (alternative) appropriate control group, our difference-in-differences approach addresses these confounding factors and can distinguish (self-selection-induced) regression to the mean from distortion.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED
This section discusses the residual income-based performance measure EVA and our empirical measure of firm value (that is, relative total shareholder return (RTSR)).
Residual Income and Economic Value Added
Economists have long acknowledged that an appropriate measure of value creation for firms should be based on the difference between earnings and the costs of capital employed (see Hamilton, 1777; Marshall, 1890; Biddle et al., 1997) . In the twentieth century, various explicit measures of value creation were operationalized. These are called Residual Income (RI) based measures. They are often used as a performance indicator of (divisions or entire) firms and used as a basis for the reward of board members, because of their alignment with the main goal of forprofit organizations (that is, to add value to the owners' wealth in excess of their opportunity costs).
Residual income is defined as net operating profits after tax (NOPAT), minus a charge for invested capital. 4 This capital charge equals the firm's weighted average cost of capital (WACC), times the amount of capital employed. The WACC essentially weighs the minimally required return on equity and the required interest rate on debt according to the relative equity and debt levels in the financial structure of the company. Residual income is operationalized as follows: 1995 (1996) . Because of the fact that EVA was such a popular performance measure that is believed to be relatively undistorted, we decided to apply the CM test to companies who have adopted this measure in comparison to non-adopters.
There are two additional motivations for studying a sample of EVA-adopters. First, EVA adopters predominantly use EVA as the sole measure in the board's (short-term) incentive plan, due to the strong recommendation by Stern Stewart to do so (Stewart, 1991) . The sole use of EVA is necessary given the assumptions of the model and the tractability of their validity, see Section 2. Second, adopting EVA as a RI based measure in the compensation plan is a deliberate, radical and significant change, supervised by a professional company, i.e., Stern
Stewart. This radical and significant shift is also vital given the difference-in-differences approach we adopt.
Given these attractive features of the sample of EVA -adopters for our current purpose, we prefer the study of that group compared to the wider group of all companies that adopt an RIbased measure of any other kind in ways that are less uniform. Nevertheless, the focus of our empirical analysis is the accounting-based value of EVA that omits the (standard and discretionary)
adjustments, see below. Thus, we effectively study the effect of adopting RI as a performance measure in the CEO's compensation contract for the selection of firms that claim to have started using a particular form of it, i.e. the trademarked version named EVA.
The early average adoption year, together with the required long time series of data before (and after) the introduction of EVA and the unavailability of Stern Stewart adjustments earlier than 1990, compels us to apply the accounting-based value of EVA as defined in equation (1) and to refrain from the Stern Stewart adjustments in our empirical tests. We acknowledge that the adjusted value of EVA may differ from the accounting-based EVA calculation in equation (1).
Yet we expect these differences to be of relatively minor importance for our analysis. First, in practice the typical EVA-adopter only makes a few of these adjustments, if at all (see Malmi and Ikaheimo, 2003; Martin and Perry, 2000; Young, 1999; Young and O'Byrne. 2001) . Second, as Biddle et al. (1997, p. 314) show, the correlation between EVA based on the published numbers by Stern Stewart and the accounting-based value of EVA amounts to 0.90. Anderson et al (2005) similarly obtain a strong relationship between unadjusted and adjusted EVA. Third, Wallace (1997, section 4.6.2) finds that the effect of an EVA-based compensation plan on managers'
behavior is independent of these adjustments to earnings. 6 We measure the three ingredients of accounting based EVA in equation (1) as follows.
NOPAT is the operating profit that accrues to shareholders and debt holders, and was obtained from the Thompson Worldscope database in the following two ways:
While in theory both approaches would logically yield the same result, they are, in practice, slightly distinct. 7 This study takes the average of the two and reports the results obtained when using either one of these definitions on its own in a separate robustness check in online Appendix B.
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (Stark and Thomas, 1998) .
9
The amount of Capital Employed is proxied by the average annual book value of total assets employed by the company, based on accounting data taken from the WorldScope database. The average is calculated by taking the average of the year end and year start values. Stewart (1991) and Stern et al. (1995) posit that an EVA-based bonus plan should be based on incremental increases (or the improvement in EVA), such that mere company size does 7 For example, negative tax rates are not revealed in the Thompson WorldScope database, thus rendering the reimbursement of taxes impossible if using equation (2a)-but not if using equation (2b).
8 The calculated WACC level is affected by judgmental decisions regarding the length and periodicity of the periods included in the calculations of , a component of the capital asset-pricing model used to determine the required rate of return on equity, the levels of the risk-free rate and the risk spread. Moreover, required interest rates do not unambiguously follow from the observed annual interest payments, dependent on a company's possible suspended or accelerated interest payments. 9 We note that the implicit assumption that a unique WACC level applies to all company-year observations in the sample is unrealistic. Even stronger, WACC levels are even unlikely to be the same for distinct divisions/business units within companies (Kruger, Landier and Thesmar, 2011) . Therefore, it would be reasonable to employ differential predetermined WACC-levels for various company-year observations, for instance dependent on the risk associated with each company in each year. However, it is difficult to think of uncomplicated observable characteristics that affect the variation in the WACC level across company-year observations and the literature appears relatively silent about the existence of such indicators. As long as the variation in WACC levels does not vary systematically between treatment and control companies, the results of our difference in difference approach are likely to remain unaffected.

 not determine bonus levels. We therefore take as the performance measure actually studied: ∆EVA = EVA t -EVA t-1 , with EVA t calculated on the basis of equation (1).
3.2
Relative Total Shareholder Return (RTSR) as a measure of firm value
The most widely accepted goal of (for-profit) organizations is maximization of value creation (see Baker 1992; Kaplan & Norton, 1996) . In companies, value creation is commonly measured in terms of shareholder value creation, since shareholders are the residual claimants of the company. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF EVA-ADOPTERS AND NON-ADOPTERS
The group of 67 treated firms consists of basically all companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange that publicly communicated adoption of ∆EVA in the compensation scheme of the company's board members (before 2004) and whose basic accounting and market information could be found. Appendix A provides the details of our data search method and includes a list of all treatment firms, including the year in which ∆EVA was implemented (mean 1995, median 1996) .
Seventy-one percent of the companies in the treatment group use ∆EVA as the sole measure in the (short-term) incentive plan, as recommended by Stern Stewart (Stewart, 1991) Table   A1 . Our analyses require at least four company-year observations both before t 0 and after t 0 of all the variables in the analyses (three observations in terms of changes). This reduces the sample to 40 treatment and 49 control firms and to 34 pairs matched on size and sector to perform all of the analyses.
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As discussed, the Courty and Marschke (CM) approach suffers from a potential endogeneity bias. If the decision to use EVA for rewarding management performance is partly driven by the statistical measures that appear in the CM tests, these tests are potentially confounded by regression to the mean. A priori this is likely to be the case because (theoretically) the two most probable drivers of adopting a particular performance measure are (low) noise and (little) distortion.
Noise is typically measured by the (time-series) variance in the performance measure due to factors beyond the agent's control (see Prendergast, 2002; Coles et al., 2006) , whereas a commonly used (but misguided) inverse measure of distortion is the correlation between the performance measure and company value (see Biddle et al., 1997; Stark and Thomas, 1998; Feltham et al., 2004) . 13 Thus, one might expect that -before treatment-the average variance of ∆EVA is lower whereas the correlation between ∆EVA and firm value is higher for firms in the treatment group vis-à-vis firms in the control group. The upper halves of Table 1 show that the treatment group and (first) control group indeed differ as expected, due to self-selection in terms of the before-treatment values of the three key CM statistics. The one-sided pairwise t-tests in the last column of Table 1 show that the beforetreatment values of the correlation (Panel A) and covariance (Panel C) are indeed higher in the treatment group than in the control group, whereas the standard deviation of ∆EVA is lower in the treatment sample (Panel B). The only significant difference is the correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR (Panel A). 14 A multivariate (probit) analysis that studies the drivers of selection into the treatment sample supports the picture communicated in Table 1 . Here, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for treatment firms and zero for control firms, whereas the set of independent variables includes the time-series correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR and the time-series standard deviation of ∆EVA. Also in this analysis, the only observed significant determinant of selection into the treatment sample (given a similar control sample in terms of sector, company size and age) is the correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR (before treatment). The higher this correlation is, the more likely that the performance measure is adopted. Given this, a decreasing correlation upon adopting the measure in the board's reward contract may not necessarily indicate distortion, but may alternatively point at regression to the mean. We therefore compose a second control group (taken from the list of firms in the right-hand part of Table A1 in Appendix A for which we have enough information).
15 Firms in this group are matched pairwise to firms in the treatment group on the sole basis of the pre-treatment correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR, separately for k=8 and k=10. 16 This k-specific matching serves as a guarantee that each pair consists of a treatment-and a control firm whose pre-treatment correlations between ∆EVA and RTSR do not differ by more than 0.1. The resulting correlation-based matched samples (for k=8
14 Table B1 in online Appendix B shows that these results are similar when using alternative measures of ∆EVA, based on alternative definitions of NOPAT or alternative WACC levels. 15 Observations omitted from the first SIC/Size matched sample (treatment or control) due to missing data for the counterpart (in terms of SIC/Size), are reconsidered for inclusion in the second (pre-correlation matches) sample. 16 Exact propensity score matching is unnecessary, as matching is based on one explanatory variable.
and k=10) are somewhat limited in size due to the different distributions in the two samples of the pre-treatment correlations. We must omit firms with very high pre-treatment correlations from the treatment sample and firms with very low correlations from the control group. The resulting sample size is 31 matched pairs for both k=8 and k=10.
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The lower halves of Table 1 show that the differences between the treatment-and this matched control group are indeed negligible in the pre-treatment period t 0 k to t 0 1 in terms of the key CM statistics for both k=8 and k=10. 18 Therefore, we think it is useful to present in Section 5 the results of the CM tests based on a comparison of both the first (SIC/Size-based) and the second (correlation-based) set of treatment-and control firm pairs.
EVIDENCE OF DISTORTIONS AND GAMING
This section tests for the presence of distortions in ∆EVA, using tests (CM.1) and (CM.2) from Section 2.
19 Table 2 reports the correlation levels between ∆EVA and RTSR before and after activation of the performance measure for both sets of treatment-control samples and for both time spans k. The right-hand side reports the difference between the correlations after and before treatment (Corr) and the difference-in-differences between the treatment and the control group 17 Paired t-tests show that this matched control group is also not significantly different from the treatment group in terms of ∆EVA, RTSR, size, company age since IPO before the year t 0 ., (for k=8 or k=10). Further inspection of the data shows that EVA adoption is not confounded or driven by CEO changes around the date of activation of the measure.
18 This test is two-sided, given the alternative hypothesis that the two samples have different average values of the pretreatment correlations (unlike the expectations for the SIC/Size matched sample), without prior expectations about the sign of the difference.
19 These tests are also performed for the alternative measures of ∆EVA based on different calculations of NOPAT and different WACC levels, with the results reported in online Appendix B. In all cases the findings for the alternative measurements are comparable to those reported here. 135] The p-values reported in square brackets are based on a one-sided paired t-test, and confirm the expectation that the decrease of the correlation levels is larger in the treatment group than in the group of control firms. A significant difference at the 10% (5%) [1%] level is denoted by * (**) [***]. DID refers to difference-indifferences.
The results support distortion of the performance measure ∆EVA. The correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR decreases significantly in the treatment group, but (typically) not in the matched control group. The difference-in-differences are large and mostly significant. They are smaller, however, for the correlation-based treatment-control comparisons than for the SIC/Size-based treatment-control comparisons. This indicates that regression to the mean explains part of the decreased correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR once ∆EVA is implemented. Yet regression to the mean is certainly not the single driving force, as is indicated by the significantly negative estimates of  2 Corr for the correlation-matched sample of pairs (when k=8). Degradation plays an important role as well. Overall, Table 2 thus provides plausible evidence for the distortion of ∆EVA as a performance measure.
In online Appendix C we investigate the changes in the slope coefficient from regressing RTSR on ∆EVA as an alternative test of distortion and obtain exactly the same conclusion. The evidence in favor of distortion is thus robust.
Distortion may either point at suboptimal amounts of productive effort, or at unproductive gaming activities detrimental to firm value. Evidence of whether gaming plays a role is obtained by applying test (CM.2.) that measures the change in the covariance. The results reported in Table 3 display a clear pattern in support of gaming: the reductions in the covariances in the treatment group are significantly greater than the comparable reductions in the control group. This holds for both matching methods and for both levels of k. Using a decrease in the covariance to detect gaming assumes that incentives are not weakened over time (see test (CM.2) in Section 2). This assumption is likely to be met for our sample. Murphy (2012) shows strong evidence of the increased incentive intensity for US based listed firms between 1992-2011. His Figures 2.4 and 2.5 reveal that the fraction of variable pay in overall pay has significantly increased over time.. 20 We are thus fairly confident that this holds for our sample as well. 20 Measuring incentive intensities is not straightforward and the various measures that are commonly used all point in the same direction: the incentive intensity of CEOs has increased across the board in the period of our study. CEOs effective ownership of stock as % of total number of shares outstanding (i.e. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 's pay performance sensitivity measure) steadily increased from 1992 to 2004, just as CEOs "equity at stake" did, i.e. CEOs change in wealth for a 1% change in the value of the firm, see Figures 2.8 and 2.9 in Murphy (2012) . Frydman and Saks (2010, Figure 6) also observe a strong and steady increase in both Hall and Liebman (1998) All in all, we conclude that the performance measure ∆EVA is distorted. Our results suggest that part of this distortion is due to gaming of the performance measure by board members. The changes in statistical association between ∆EVA and firm value upon incorporating ∆EVA in the board's remuneration plan are also driven by regression to the mean.
Correcting the CM tests for self-selection is thus imperative.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Accounting research has traditionally assessed the quality of performance measures based on the association between the measured value of the performance measure and some indicator of the firm's objective function. Residual Income-based performance measures-and Economic Value
Added in particular-have been subject to such evaluations, leading to mixed results (e..g Biddle et al., 1997; Chen and Dodd, 1997; Feltham et al., 2004; O'Byrne, 1997; Stark and Thomas, 1998; Wallace 1997 ). More recently, however, Baker (2002) has shown that what matters is not the association between the levels of the performance measure and the company's objective function, but rather the association between the marginal effects of effort on these two metrics. Unfortunately, the association between these margins as a (inverse) measure of distortion is harder to assess. Courty and Marschke (2008) recently developed a suitable empirical test to detect distortion in performance measures. This paper applies their test to the (accounting based value of the) performance measure EVA, a Residual Income-based performance measure widely used in corporate practice. The test is adapted in order to cope with self-selection and timing decisions. In particular, we take a difference-in-differences approach, where the control group consists of a matched sample of suitably selected firms.
Overall, our test results indicate that the accounting based value of EVA is a distorted performance measure. Differences (in differences) are somewhat more pronounced when the treatment-control group pairs consist of firms that are similar in terms of industry and size than when pairs are formed based on similar pre-treatment correlations between RTSR and ∆EVA (the main driver of self-selection into the treatment). This indicates that regression to the mean explains part of the decrease in correlation between RTSR and ∆EVA after the activation of EVA. Yet the significant differences that we observe for our second control group reveal that degradation plays a key role as well. Moreover, under the reasonable assumption that overall incentives have not weakened over time (cf. Murphy, 2012, Frydman and Saks, 2010) , our finding that the covariance between RTSR and ∆EVA decreases more for the treatment firms supports gaming. There is, thus, reasonable evidence that the distortions detected are partly due to gaming.
Our finding that EVA is a distorted performance begs the question exactly how it can be gamed. The empirical accounting literature tentatively suggests that managers may engage in 'earnings management' and 'short-termism' to artificially boost current EVA at the expense of future EVA. First, using EVA may give managers incentives to manipulate when actual accounting profits are reported, as to influence pay that depend on reported earnings (Healy, 1985; Young and O'Byrne, 2001) . 21 Second, distortions may arise from EVA being a short-term, singleperiod performance measure. Managers may want to avoid negative EVA projects-even if these projects are profitable in the long run (see Bromwich and Walker, 1998; O'Hanlon and Peasnell, 1998) . In line with this, Wallace (1997) finds suggestive evidence that managers whose rewards are EVA-based may actually under-invest in projects that render a positive net present value relative to managers whose rewards are based on more traditional (earnings-based) performance measures.
Relative to non-adopters, EVA-adopters dispose of more assets and decrease their new investments, whereas they use their remaining assets more intensively.
22
A potential interesting avenue for future research would be to complement our general 21 The incentive to manage earnings is provoked by the use of upper limits to restrict bonus payments, although this practice counters the recommendations of Stern Stewart & Co.
22 As noted by Wallace (1997, p. 287) , it is difficult to establish whether the observed changes in behavior are valuedecreasing. Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997) show that, theoretically, EVA-based compensation can provide first-best investment incentives if depreciation schedules are chosen such that investment costs are spread out over the investment's lifetime exactly proportionally to the benefits. The intuition is that EVA then reflects the value created by the manager at any given point in time.
test based on Courty and Marschke (2008) with an analysis of accounting information to test for some of the specific ways of gaming discussed above. If specific gaming activities could be empirically identified for our sample of firms, this would reinforce our conclusions. At the same time, there are likely to be numerous ways in which a performance measure can be manipulated, and managers may be very creative in findings the more opaque ways to do so. The general test of Courty and Marschke has the advantage that distortions can be detected without being omniscient of all the possible ways in which a measure can be gamed.
As noted in the Introduction, our findings do not imply that EVA is a poor performance measure. First, our empirical analysis has little to say about the economic relevance of the distortion identified in terms of efficiency losses. This would require observing the counterfactual, i.e. changes in firm value under fist best incentives. Second, our analysis is unable to make comparisons of the distortions and thus the relative welfare losses when any other performance measure is used.
Another interesting topic for future research would therefore be to extend the Courty and Marschke (2008) approach to find ways in which the distortions detected in different performance measures could be meaningfully compared. In the end it may be more valuable to know which out of several available measures is least subject to gaming (in terms of efficiency losses), than just establishing that a given measure can be gamed.
board member remuneration. 26 For seven of these companies none of the crucial accounting or market data was available at all. This resulted in 67 treatment firms (see Table A1 below).
Determining the treatment start and end
The exact implementation year t 0 for each treatment firm was deduced from their proxy We also checked if and when EVA-adopters abandoned the use of this measure as part of the compensation contract later on. Roughly 58% did so in the 11 years (at most) that we observed after the measure's introduction-on average, after 7.5 years. Thus, only relatively few company-year observations are involved (approximately 7%). These observations are set to missing values in the regressions for the relevant treatment-control pairs. The results are qualitatively similar when we ignore the elimination of the performance measure.
Selection of matched control firms in the first (SIC/Size) control sample
As in Wallace (1997) , firms are first matched on the 4-digit SIC code. Next, the firm that is closest in size is selected as control. Size is measured by sales volume in the year prior to the treatment firm's adoption of ∆EVA (i.e. year t 0 1). In some cases this matching procedure fails to allocate a suitable control firm-for instance, due to an insufficient number of years of data available, large temporal disparities in the fiscal year ending, or large size differences. 27 In these cases, matching takes place on 3-digit, or in a few cases even two-digit SIC codes. Two firms were used twice as a control firm. We treat these as independent observations in the analyses.
26 Kleiman (1999) followed a similar search procedure with slightly different criteria and obtained a set of 71 EVAadopters.
